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CONCEPTUALISING MORAL RESILIENCE FOR NURSING PRACTICE 
T.M.L.Sala Defilippis, K.Curtis, A.Gallagher  
 
ABSTRACT 
The term ‘moral resilience’ has been gaining momentum in the nursing ethics literature. This may be due 
to it representing a potential response to moral problems such as moral distress. Moral resilience has 
been conceptualised as a factor that inhibits immoral actions, as a favourable outcome and as an ability 
to bounce back after a morally distressing situation. In this article, the philosophical analysis of moral 
resilience is developed by challenging these conceptualisations and highlighting the risks of such limiting 
perspectives. It is argued that moral resilience is best understood as a virtue with two associated vices; 
faintheartedness and rigidity. The intellectual virtue of practical wisdom is required to express resilience 
as a virtue. This understanding leads to recommendations for professional education, for practice and 
further research. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Nursing practice presents ethical opportunities to promote the flourishing of patients, families and 
communities. Nursing practice also presents ethical challenges. (Epstein & Delgado, 2010; Lützén, 
Cronqvist, Magnusson, & Andersson, 2003; Schluter, Winch, Holzhauser, & Henderson, 2008). The 
challenges that nurses encounter include a range of moral problems as outlined by Johnstone (2009). 
By moral problems Johnstone (2009) refers to: “moral matter or issue that is difficult to deal with, solve 
or overcome” (p. 94). One of the most researched moral issues in recent years is that of ‘moral distress’. 
This involves negative feelings resulting from situations where the moral agent feels unable to act 
according to her or his moral judgement (Corley, Elswick, Gorman, & Clor, 2001; Hamric, 2012; Hanna, 
2004; Jameton, 1984). Moral distress has been further developed introducing the differentiation between 
initial and reactive moral distress (Jameton, 1993). Additionally, the factors which can rise to moral 
distress have been identifies such as factors internal to the caregiver; factors external to the caregiver; 
and clinical situations (Hamric, 2012).  
It has been suggested that in order to reduce or avoid moral distress, and its deleterious consequences, 
one should try to maintain his or her moral integrity. It has been argued that this includes finding a source 
of inhibition which prevents conduct evaluated by the moral agent as wrong. Musschenga (2001) defined 
moral integrity as the coherence between one’s beliefs and values and actions and as coherence 
between all roles and domains of one’s life. Hardingham (2004) described integrity as “wholeness in the 
relationship between our actions and our values and beliefs” (p. 129). However, integrity should not be 
understood as being static but rather as something continuously changing and thus as a process that 
finds its roots in personal self-knowledge and self-reflection (Cox, La Caze, & Levine, 2003). The ability 
to negotiate one’s values is also pivotal in the case of conflicts with partners because it allows nurses to 
foster and determine their readiness and willingness to find compromises. Indeed, McFall (1987) stated 
that in order to maintain integrity, commitments have to be ranked for importance, and not all 
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commitments can be unconditional.  
The source of inhibition which prevents wrong conduct has been defined in the literature as ‘moral 
resilience’. Monteverde (2016) has defined moral resilience as a favourable outcome following an 
experience of moral distress.  Rushton (2016) has defined it as the individual’s ability to bounce back 
after an experience of moral distress.  
What follows, in this article, is a critique of the current conceptualisations of moral resilience. This critique 
aims to demonstrate that the current conceptualisations are not sufficient for nursing. Nursing will be 
discussed as a moral practice, following MacIntyre’s definition of practice, where virtues play a central 
part. This is followed by a discussion of the value of virtue ethics in relation to nursing. Finally we offer 
an interpretation of moral resilience as a virtue with its vices.  
 
NURSING AS A MORAL PRACTICE 
Nursing can be understood as a moral practice (Armstrong, 2007; Bishop & Scudder, 2001; Edwards, 
2001; Gastmans, de Casterlé, & Schotsmans, 1998; Sellman, 2011). This is in accord   with the definition 
offered by MacIntyre (2011).  
MacIntyre (2011) asserts that practice is carried out in a socially established way, which implies that the 
person who enters the practice in invited to embrace its standards and the mean time to partially 
renounce at personal taste, preferences and attitudes (MacIntyre, 2011).  
In order to better understand the practice of nursing we would like to briefly discuss the definition of a 
practice offered by MacIntyre. MacIntyre (2011) defines a practice as follows:  
“By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex from of socially established cooperative 
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends 
and goods involved, are systematically extended” (p. 218). 
We focus on four elements of MacIntyre’s definition which are relevant to nursing. First, we have to 
consider that practice must be carried out within a community, which guarantees collaboration and 
coherence. Second, the community must have a shared knowledge of the practice. Third, practices have 
internal and external goods - by internal goods are meant virtues, which are exercised for their own sake 
and with the aim of achieving standards of excellence. External goods are not necessary for practice, but 
only as a contingency that is not specific to a determinate practice; such as fame and money. The result 
of exercising virtues is the acquisition of knowledge and skills specific to that practice. The choice of the 
virtues and their meaning is inspired by phronēsis, which is guided by logos and the ultimate goal of 
engaging in a practice is represented by eudaimonia, that is to say to live a flourishing or happy life. 
Finally, internal goods can only be appreciated and judged by individuals who engage in the practice.  
Applying this understanding of practice to nursing involves  reflection on virtue ethics. Aristotle divided 
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virtues into two types: ethical (or moral) and intellectual  virtues where ethical virtues refer to morality and 
to the individual’s behaviour whereas intellectual virtues refer to the intellect and reason, which determine 
the exercise of ethical virtues (Ross & Brown, 2009). Aristotle asserted that humans have the potential 
for developing virtues but they need to be exercised continuously in order to become a habit and a 
custom: “neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted 
by nature to receive them [virtues] and are made perfect by habit” (Ross & Brown, 2009, p. 23).  In fact 
the Greek word ethos means habit, use, custom, way of being (Rocci, 2010). Aristotle argued that a 
singular virtuous action is not enough to be virtuous as virtues need to be exercised continuously. He 
asserts that: “For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a 
short time, does not make a man blessed and happy“ (Ross and Brown, 2009, p.12). According to 
Aristotle, it is not so important that someone knows exactly what a determinate virtue is, but it is more 
important that someone acts according to that virtue (Ross & Brown 2009). The exercise and the amount 
of the requested virtue vary from situation-to-situation depending on the details and its characteristics 
(Ross & Brown 2009). This is to say that virtue is not the median point between two vices but rather the 
mean  between two vices, which depends on the characteristics of the singular situation.  Aristotle 
asserted: “Thus a master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses 
this – the intermediate not in the object but relatively to us.” (Ross & Brown, 2009, p. 30).  
But how can a person recognise the intermediate point and which virtues need to be exercised in a given 
situation? This choice is made possible by the intellectual virtue of phronēsis. In order to live a practical 
life, which is not contemplative, the most important intellectual virtue is represented by practical wisdom 
(phronēsis). Phronēsis refers to the particular wisdom, which helps the individual to choose the right 
ethical virtue to exercise in a given situation in order to achieve the telos (Ross & Brown 2009). On 
phronēsis Aristotle asserted: “The remaining alternative, then, is that it is a true and reasoned state of 
capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man.” (Ross & Brown, 2009, p. 106). 
In recent years virtue ethics has gained much attention among nurses and ethicists (Armstrong, 2006, 
2007; Banks & Gallagher, 2009; Hooft, 1999; Sellman, 2011).  
In keeping with MacIntyre’s (2011) arguments, Edwards (2001) asserted that the technical activities of 
nursing, interpretations, and morality are crucial for nursing practice and represent its internal goods. 
These involve virtues such as empathy, honesty, integrity, courage,  justice and care (Edwards, 2001). 
These virtues find their expression in the practice of nursing and are necessary in order to achieve the 
ultimate goals of the vocation. Bishop and Scudder (2001) believed these virtues to be necessary in order 
to be a good nurse, which is defined as one that is concerned for their patients. This concern is central 
to efficient, effective and attentive care that fosters patient wellbeing. 
Sellman (2011) defined nursing as a practice in the MacIntyrean sense as well: “The good that nursing 
seeks is the wellbeing of individual patients, which characterises nursing as a moral enterprise with 
associated moral obligation on the part of individual nurses to provide excellent care. Nursing is thus a 
caring practice that aims at the good of those who find themselves in receipt of nursing” (p. 101). 
Sellman (2011) identified the virtues of honesty, justice and courage as being at the core of nursing 
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practice, and trustworthiness and open-mindedness as indispensable attitudes. Armstrong (2007) 
dedicated a book chapter to the notion of nursing practice based on MacIntyre’s work and partially on 
Sellman’s work. Armstrong (2007) agreed with Sellman’s conception of nursing as a practice, in 
accordance with MacIntyre’s perspective, but claimed that Sellman lacks clarity in addressing the internal 
goods of nursing. Armstrong (2007) suggested that internal goods are only achievable through the 
exercise of virtues, because internal goods are represented by the feelings and emotional responses that 
arise in nurses when they act, think and feel in a morally virtuous way. Armstrong (2007) stated that 
standards of excellence can only be reached through the exercise of kindness, patience, courage, 
compassion, justice and respectfulness. He did not give a clear definition of ‘standards of excellence’ in 
nursing but asserted that they relate to the particular ends of nursing. However, according to some 
authors, the ultimate goals of nursing are to alleviate pain and suffering, maintain patients’ dignity, 
promote recovery, enhance quality of life and offer comfort (Armstrong, 2007; Benner, 1997; Edwards, 
2001; Gastmans et al., 1998; Sellman, 2011). These goals were defined by Sellman (2011) as “goods of 
excellence” (p.80). 
In real life, the goods of excellence sometimes clash with the goods of effectiveness usually pursued by 
organisations. This clash inevitably leads nurses into areas of tension and fields of conflict, especially 
with institutions, which fail to value the goods of excellence expected by nurses (Sellman, 2011). 
 
MORAL DISTRESS IN NURSING 
The literature on moral sources of stress among nurses is substantial. Lützén and Kvist (2012) 
differentiated between moral stress and moral distress: the former serves as a reminder of moral 
obligation and represents a sign of moral sensitivity; the latter refers to the set of negative outcomes 
following unsuccessful acting in a situation of moral stress. As suggested by Lützén and Kvist (2012) 
literature in nursing is much more focussed on moral distress than on moral stress. This is due to the 
negative and devastating consequences of moral distress such as burnout and leaving practice. Hamric 
(2012) offers a comprehensive classification of sources of moral distress among nurses. She 
differentiates between: factors internal to the caregiver (perceived powerlessness, lack of knowledge of 
alternatives or of the full situation); factors external to the caregiver (institutional constraints such as 
inadequate staffing, lack of administrative support, incompetent caregivers); and clinical situations 
(unnecessary/futile treatment, aggressive treatment not in the patient’s best interest, inadequate 
informed consent, lack of truth-telling, such as giving false hope).  
Oh and Gastmans (2015) carried out a quantitative literature review on moral distress experienced by 
nurses. Their findings indicate that the main sources of moral distress are: working with incompetent 
staff; giving futile care; the nursing shortage; and uncooperative challenging behaviour by patients or 
family members. 
The term ‘moral distress’ was first used by Jameton in 1984 who stated that: “Moral distress arises when 
one knows the right thing to do, but institutional constraints make it nearly impossible to pursue the right 
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course of action.” (p. 6). Hanna (2004) offers a much more complete and complex definition of moral 
distress, asserting that it involves a perceived violation of the person, whether this is articulated or not, 
and it produces a disconnection from one’s self and others and it represents a harm of one’s living 
purpose. 
In later writing, Jameton (1993) distinguishes between initial distress which is felt as soon as a decision 
is felt as wrong and reactive distress which is the set of feelings resulting from failing to avoid the pursuit 
of the right course of action. Webster and Baylis (2000) refer to moral distress as an incoherence between 
one’s beliefs and actions and to moral residue  as negative feelings resulting from losing one’s own moral 
integrity as a result of failing to pursue what is thought to be the right course of action (Webster & Baylis, 
2000). Epstein and Hamric (2009) enlarge the discourse on moral residue, asserting that it has a 
cumulative effect: each time one experiences a morally distressing situation he or she will never go back 
to the condition before the episode. The next time he or she will experience a morally distressing situation 
she/he will start from an already higher level of distress due to the residue of the previous experience.  
Even though some authors have amended  the concept of moral distress, there is general agreement  in 
the literature that moral distress arises from some kind of constraint which prevents nurses form 
exercising their moral agency; that  moral distress is connoted by two phases (initial and reactive); and 
that the experience of moral distress can intensify over time. (McCarthy & Gastmans, 2015) According 
to McCarthy and Gastmans (2015)  consensus is reached  in describing moral distress in psychological-
emotional-physiological terms. Moral distress has not only negative consequences on nurses, but also 
on quality of care.  
Some studies have investigated how nurses react to moral distress (De Villers & Devon, 2013; Deady & 
McCarthy, 2010; Gutierrez, 2005; Varcoe, Pauly, Storch, Newton, & Makaroff, 2012). The results from 
all these studies demonstrated mainly negative reactions that directly affected the quality of care. One of 
the reactions that emerge from the literature is avoidance (De Villers & Devon, 2013; Deady & McCarthy, 
2010; Gutierrez, 2005; Varcoe et al., 2012) which is defined as the withdrawal of information or 
suppressing arguments in order to prevent conflicts or protecting self-identity (Wang, Fink, & Cai, 2012).  
Recently the attention of researchers has moved from investigating the frequency and intensity of moral 
distress to finding solutions to the problem.  
 
MORAL RESILIENCE AS A RESPONSE TO MORAL DISTRESS?  
Webster and Baylis (2000) argued  that moral distress can lead to an erosion of moral integrity. Thus, 
doing something to maintain one’s moral integrity could potentially represent a way to avoid these 
negative consequences. The literature suggests that in order to maintain moral integrity one should find 
a resource to inhibit oneself in doing wrong while strengthening one’s moral agency  (Burston & Tuckett, 
2013; Grace, Robinson, Jurchak, Zollfrank, & Lee, 2014; Monteverde, 2014; Monteverde, 2016; Musto, 
Rodney, & Vanderheide, 2015).  
According to Titus (2006) and Oser and Reichenbach (2005) moral resilience represents the source of 
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inhibition for immoral actions and is necessary in order to resist negative external and internal pressures 
when taking a moral decision.  
Titus (2006) asserts that moral resilience is only possible if the moral agent exercises the virtue of 
fortitude.  Titus (2006) follows a Christian theological discourse where the final goal is represented as  
salvation of the soul.   
Oser and Reichenbach (2005) approach the discourse of moral resilience from a slightly different 
perspective. They assert that moral resilience is, on one hand, the source of inhibition for immoral actions 
and, on the other hand, it can potentially represent a source of unhappiness. In a later writing Oser, 
Schmid, and Hattersley (2006) declare that this is often due to the fact that morality and success 
represent a difficult binomial where the two things are frequently in contrast with each other. Oser et al. 
(2006) reach this conclusion through a series of studies, which demonstrated that maintaining a high 
degree of coherence with one’s beliefs often leads to unhappiness due to failure to receive external 
rewards. What emerges from the perspectives offered by Titus (2006), Oser and Reichenbach (2005) 
and Oser et al. (2006) is that they are all more concerned with the behaviour of the individual, who needs 
to take a decision which mainly affects him or herself, rather than with individuals who  practice 
collaboratively.  Titus (2006) asserts that fortitude and moral resilience represent the key for salvation in 
a religious discourse and Oser and Reichenbach (2005) assert that the personal reward, which the 
individual  receives when he displays moral resilience, is often frustrating due to the lack of external 
rewards.  
Recently the term moral resilience has entered the field of nursing as a possible response to moral 
distress. Monteverde (2016) defined  moral resilience: ‘as an outcome based on as a change in PMD 
[Perceived Moral Distress through the administration of moral distress thermometer] in a given axis of 
time’ (p.107). Thus it could be suggested that Monteverde (2016) clearly defines moral resilience as a 
favourable and desirable outcome after an episode of moral distress. Monteverde (2016) measured the 
success of ethics education based on lectures introducing the typology of moral stressors. Before and 
after the lecture, students were presented with vignettes depicting morally stressful situations. In his 
findings, Monteverde (2016) reported a statistically relevant reduction in measured levels of perceived 
moral distress after the lectures. Monteverde (2016) argues that  moral resilience is a favourable and 
desirable outcome. This would mean that providing students - and more generally healthcare workers - 
with a sound knowledge of ethics could potentially prevent them from developing moral distress, or at 
least from developing its negative consequences by supporting their moral agency. However, defining 
moral resilience as an outcome that can be influenced by improving nurses’ moral agency through 
education also presents some challenges. It could be suggested that Monteverde (2016), Titus (2006), 
Oser and Reichenbach (2005) and Oser et al. (2006) are all more concerned with the behaviour of the 
individual who needs to take decisions that mainly affect him or herself, rather than with the behaviour of 
individuals who operate in collaboration with others. The risk in applying this understanding of moral 
resilience is that of ‘moral complacency’, defined as the refusal to accept the possibility that one’s own 
moral judgment or conviction is wrong, or to the even more dangerous problems of  ‘moral fanaticism’, 
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which stem from a blind adherence to principles, regardless of the situation and of the people affected 
by the consequences (Johnstone, 2009). 
So, is moral resilience a desirable outcome that is helpful for nurses?  
Rushton (2016) offers a definition of moral resilience that draws from the general definition of resilience 
in psychology. In psychology resilience has been defined as the ability of bouncing back and coping 
successfully in spite of significant stress or adversities (Connor & Davidson, 2003; Jackson, Firtko, & 
Edenborough, 2007; Tusaie & Dyer, 2004). Rushton (2016) defines moral resilience as: “Moral resilience 
is defined as the capacity of an individual to sustain or restore their integrity in response to moral 
complexity, confusion, or setbacks” (p. 112). From this definition emerges clearly a very strong 
individualistic aspect of moral resilience. The individualistic focus  has been  challenged by Traynor 
(2017). His discourse addresses psychological resilience but one could argue that his  arguments against 
psychological resilience apply to the definition of moral resilience offered by Rushton (2016). His point is 
that the risk of applying  an individualistic perspective to resilience  charges the individual with too much 
responsibility even in  situations where the suffering is provoked by others  (Traynor, 2017).  Traynor  
(2017) writes: “When a situation is intolerable, coping and resilience is not a good answer” (p.27) and “I 
think it is preferable to make sure you stop getting hit rather than learn how to be able to last longer 
before you finally collapse” (p. 28). Traynor (2017) does not deny the need for resilience among nurses, 
but he argues that resilience must involve the ability of critique, which in turn includes the deep 
understanding of a situation which causes sufferance. The critique should aim at differentiating between 
suffering proper of the profession such as for example assisting suffering patients and suffering caused 
by the system, such as for example under-resourcing or poor management (Traynor, 2017). Traynor 
(2017) suggests that in order to face sufferance caused by the system, nurses should rather resist than 
acquiesce with the aim of challenge and ameliorate the system. It could be argued that in the 
individualistic definition of resilience offered by Rushton (2016) these external variables are not taken 
into account. Thus far, the definitions of moral resilience display some limitations. These limitations are 
illuminated by the discussion of the unique nature of nursing defined as a practice. 
 
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL RESILIENCE IN NURSING 
We believe that moral resilience can potentially represent an answer to moral distress, but its 
understanding needs to be contextualised within and adapted to the nursing practice, where moral 
decision-making relates to and involves patients who have to be considered as vulnerable. 
Since this paper supports the view that nursing is a practice (Armstrong, 2007; Bishop & Scudder, 2001; 
Edwards, 2001; Gastmans et al., 1998; Sellman, 2011) and that personal reward and individual 
endeavour cannot be the sole criterion when facing morally loaded situations, it is argued that there is 
the need for a different conception of moral resilience. 
The ultimate goals and thus standard of excellence in nursing practice are to alleviate pain and suffering, 
maintain the patients’ dignity, promote recovery, enhance quality of life and offer comfort (Armstrong, 
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2007; Benner, 1997; Edwards, 2001; Gastmans et al., 1998; Sellman, 2011), therefore we challenge the 
idea of moral resilience as the avoidance of doing immoral actions, because this definition does only 
consider the perspective of the moral agent. When nurses agree with patients’ needs and wishes, it can 
be argued that there is no need for moral resilience. As discussed previously, one source of ethical 
challenge is when a nurse’s opinion differs from that of patients. Applying moral resilience in the way 
Titus (2006), Oser and Reichenbach (2005), Oser et al. (2006) do can have the consequence of harming 
the patient even if we succeed in keeping our morally integrity intact. This would not be in keeping with 
the aim of moral nursing practice.  
It is suggested therefore that within nursing practice the virtue of moral resilience is the character trait, 
which allow nurses to remain open for compromises with themselves and with the given situation without 
compromising their own moral integrity.  
What follows is the rationale for the suggestion that moral resilience could be understood as a virtue in 
the Aristotelian understanding.   
According to Aristotle’s conception of virtues, they should be understood as a character trait where its 
excess and the deficiency are represented by vices (Ross & Brown 2009).  Further on in order to be 
considered good and achieve success a person must choose the right virtue according to the demands 
of the situation and its right mean according to the circumstances (Ross & Brown 2009).  
The position this paper argues is that moral resilience is a virtue according to these characteristics 
Moral Resilience as a virtue  
Resilience has been described as a set of personal characteristics and as a process. In this paper the 
focus is on resilience as a set of personal characteristics. The term ‘resilience’ has been described in the 
psychological literature as a set of character traits which allow the individual to bounce back and  thrive 
in the face of adversities (Connor & Davidson, 2003). Even if virtues refer to character traits, not all 
character traits are virtues. In order to be defined as a virtue, a character trait must be regarded as 
morally good or excellent (Banks & Gallagher, 2009).  
We suggest that moral resilience should be considered as a character trait that allows people to remain 
open to compromises without compromising themselves. This means that people should contemplate 
compromises with themselves and according to the demands of a given situation. However, this should 
happen without compromising one’s own moral integrity. This understanding includes the ability to 
bounce back in case people decide to make a concession in their ethical decision and to carry out an 
action they do not completely share but which does not compromise their moral integrity. Thus, on one 
hand moral resilience allows people to maintain an openness to compromise and on the other hand it 
helps people not succumb under unacceptable concessions.  
Vices and moral resilience 
Both excess and deficiency lead to the loss of virtue when making moral decisions. This paper suggests 
that the excess in relation to the virtue or moral resilience is represented by the vice of rigidity or 
inflexibility, that is to say a lack of readiness for any kind of compromise. Rigidity implies that when 
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someone is absolutely deeply convinced they know the right thing to do, he or she will carry out his or 
her decision without considering others’ opinions and wishes. If this is explored in depth, this meaning of 
rigidity we reflect a sort of pride, which brings the individual to the firm belief in knowing better than others 
what is the right thing to do. Moreover it could be said that this vice leads to two of the moral problems 
identified by Johnstone (2009): moral fanaticism and moral complacency. Both problems can lead to 
deleterious consequences for patients.   
The lack of moral resilience is represented by the vice of faintheartedness. Faintheartedness leads the 
individual to the desire of doing nothing probably as a consequence of a sort of moral laziness or 
weakness. Faintheartedness is not to be confused with blindness which occurs whenever the moral agent 
does not recognise the moral dimension of a given situation or with unpreparedness where the moral 
agent has a clear lack of knowledge in respect to moral issues (Johnstone, 2009). Moral faintheartedness 
partially refers to a further moral problem identified by Johnstone (2009), which is moral indifference, 
where the moral agent is not concerned or interested in the moral dimension of a given situation. It refers 
only partially to that problem because faintheartedness goes even further, with the moral agent 
recognising the moral dimension but deciding not to intervene in order not to get involved. 
Not all ethical decisions require the exercise of moral resilience. When for example all the involved 
persons agree, there is no need for moral resilience. Moral resilience is required, for example, in those 
cases where a patient, a colleague or the institution makes an explicit request that is partially against 
nurses’ beliefs. Johnstone (2009) identifies this situation as ‘partial radical moral disagreement’, defining 
it as the situation in which dissenting parties might agree on some relevant criteria but not all. However 
as asserted by Aristotle, ethics is not a precise science, and the choice of the right virtue and its right 
amount is determined by phronesis (Ross & Brown 2009). The continuous exercise of a virtue, followed 
by reflection, allows the individual to find the right mean. However as pointed out by Foot (2002) 
phronēsis implies two main things: “the wise man knows the means to certain good ends; and secondly 
he knows how much particular ends are worth” (p.5). Foot asserts that phronēsis is a virtue and thus as 
pointed out by Aristotle: “we are adapted by nature to receive them [virtues], and are made perfect by 
habit” (Ross & Brown, 2009, p. 23). Somehow there must be the will of receiving, recognising, choosing 
and exercising phronēsis in order to make a habit out of it. This paper suggests that phronēsis can only 
be learned and not taught. However,  recognising moral resilience as a virtue while considering its vices 
and while aiming at achieving nursing goods, that is, to alleviate patient’s pain and suffering, to maintain 
patients’ dignity, to promote recovery, to enhance quality of life and offer comfort (Armstrong, 2007; 
Benner, 1997; Edwards, 2001; Gastmans et al., 1998; Sellman, 2011), means nurses are brought to the 
exercise of phronēsis in a natural way. Finally, phronēsis can indicate to nurses the limit beyond which 
they risk to lose their moral integrity, harming themselves.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we argue that understanding moral resilience as a virtue can represent an innovative and, 
more importantly, a guide for nurses during their daily moral practice. We suggested that within nursing 
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practice the virtue of moral resilience is the character trait, which allows them to remain open for 
compromises with themselves and with the given situation without compromising their moral integrity. 
Excesses and defects of virtues are represented by vices, and in case of moral resilience its excess is 
represented by rigidity and its defect by faintheartedness. The mean between these two vices is chosen 
according to phronēsis. Indeed phronēsis indicates, on the one hand, the mean in order to achieve the 
good ends of nursing and on the other hand it prevents nurses from harming themselves accepting 
compromises, which can potentially compromise their moral integrity. What follows from this in terms of 
professional education and research is that educators should invite nurses to foster their self-knowledge 
about their own moral values and moral limits while reflecting on their practice experience. Research 
should focus on finding new and innovative ethics interventions for supporting nurses in doing so while 
considering the cultural context of nurse’s practice.  
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